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Church and State
It is sometimes argued that although an
abundance of quotations can be given from
American Catholic sources on the benefits
of separation of Church and State, at least
an equally abundant number favoring union of Church and State can be found in
European Catholic sources. These facts
should account for the great difference of
opinion on this problem that exists among
Catholic thinkers. Instead, the interpretation is stressed that Catholics say one thing
when they are benefiting from religious
freedom in the New World and quite another when they are benefiting from religious uniformity in the Old World.
The June 1962 issue of Catholic Mind
features an interesting article on just this
point by Father Kenneth Dougherty, S.A.,
entitled "The Real and the Ideal."
Father Dougherty states that the twentieth century brings new problems in the
relationship of Church and State. These
problems have become matters of great political and social concern in our own era,
especially prior to the election of President
Kennedy. The relation of Church and
State, in other words, is not a completely
fixed relationship. Each generation encounters it in the light of the problems existent at the time. There is great danger
in a too rigid and doctrinaire judgment of
a basic theory.

Every Catholic in America, or anywhere
else in the world, who is true to Catholic
teaching would admit that Church and
State are really distinct societies and that
there must never be a union of Church and
State which would blur the distinction between the two. The Catholic refuses to accept a separation of Church and State
which would set each off in isolated compartments, one having no relation to the
other in cooperating for the common good.
It is a cardinal principle of Catholic doctrine that the supernatural builds on the
natural in the unity of the real order. Man
must eat in order to pray. The Church has
a vital concern, therefore, in whether a
man receives a living wage, dwells in decent housing, and gets just treatment under
the law. It is completely unrealistic to
suppose that Church and State could operate in two hermetically-sealed spheres. The
state will be either friendly or hostile to religion. History testifies that there is no
middle ground.
For the Catholic, the Church is not primarily in the polis, as though it were a
national church or an ethnic religion, but
in the cosmopolis. The Catholic does not
regard the Church as another community
function-a club, labor union or fraternal
association. The Church is a complete society just as the state is. But it has a more
important goal than the state-the salva-
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tion of mankind. There is an order that
transcends the political. The Catholic rejects the principle of modern positivism
that makes every act of the state legal because it is enacted by the state. This doctrine sets aside divine and natural law as
the norms by which political acts are to be
judged.
This superiority of the spiritual does not
mean a subordination of the political order
to the personal designs of a churchman.
There is a real distinction between the
Church and churchmen. There have been
times in history when a Wolsey or a Richelieu have used their ecclesiastical powers to
gain purely political ends. Men are not
angels. Yet, in the full record of history,
the great benefits of worthy ecclesiastics
serving God and their fellow men far outweigh the excesses of some who sought to
feed themselves rather than their flocks.
The political realist knows that in our
day the great danger is not to be found in
the intrigues of powerful churchmen but in
the claims of the temporal power. Nazism,
Fascism and Communism are examples
from our own lifetime of political philosophies of totalitarianism.
May it not be said that today in our own
nation we have a supremacy of the temporal power? This point no doubt is worthy
of discussion. The forces of religion are
indeed strong in America. Yet people have
developed a cautious attitude toward the
voice of religion in the public forum. How
the supremacy of the spiritual is to be realized in our pluralistic society is more or
less a problem for every religious group.
According to Father Dougherty, the
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries witnessed the incorporation of provisions relating to Church and State in constitutional
and statutory law. The twentieth century,
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however, is an era of interpretation. The
question of aid to religious schools stands
out as the most conspicuous of problems.
Other questions pertain to taxation of
church property, censorship of movies,
Sunday Closing Laws, United States representation at the Vatican, gambling, artificial
birth control and so forth.
The emotion-charged atmosphere more
or less characteristic of all religious groups
has not improved matters. In a recent
meeting between ministers and priests in
the Boston area, the confrontation proved
enlightening. It was discovered that the
ministers' image of the Catholic was that
of a second-class citizen who must be
watched, for fear that the Vatican would
gain control of America. The priests' image
of the Protestant was that of the traditional
Yankee who had very little credal affirmation but a great deal of protest against
Rome, especially against the so-called
"Catholic bloc" vote which is really a figment of the imagination.
Dialogue has been useful in bringing
about the confrontation of priests, ministers and rabbis and has often served greatly
in producing a better understanding both of
points of departure and of common ground.
Interconfessional peace is essential to the
common good of our republic. For the sake
of the common good, respect has to be
shown for the diversity of religions in our
pluralistic society. The fear that Catholics
are half-citizens who are plotting to take
over the country in order to make our laws
and institutions Catholic to the detriment
of other faiths is certainly without foundation.
In conclusion, Father Dougherty states
that the separation of Church and State
is morally sound in the pluralistic American society. However, separation does not
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of itself exclude cooperation between the
churches and the state. The American
heritage gives evidence of such cooperation.
The churches and the state are often involved in pursuit of the common good.
The words of the Founding Fathers and
the history of governmental practices show
that the first amendment does not prohibit
cooperation between the churches and the
state. There is no neat formula that informs
us how far this cooperation can go.
In concrete situations, in which the
question of cooperation between the
churches and the state arises, public opinion is a guidepost indicating how far such
cooperation should go. In respect to the
question of federal aid to religious schools,
agreement has been reached in some instances on fringe benefits. Public opinion
seems to be moving in the direction of direct aid. Moreover, more and more attention is being given to the teaching of
some common-core religion in the public
school. For in our three-religion America, there is an ever-growing realization
of the role of religion in promoting the general welfare under God. This is a cardinal
teaching in the Judeo-Christian tradition.
Toleration
Readers of The Catholic Lawyer who
enjoyed the articles on tolerance by Father
Cahill and Cardinal Lecaro which appeared in the Spring 1961 and Winter
1962 issues will appreciate "Toleration and
Conscience" by Henry St. John, O.P., in
the April 1962 issue of Catholic Mind.
The author points out that there is a
prevalent belief among non-Catholics that
the only orthodox doctrine of religious freedom permissible to Catholics is that based
upon the distinction between thesis and
hypothesis. In thesis, where pure Roman

Catholic principles can be applied, error
must not be allowed to be propagated.
Only in hypothesis, when, in adverse circumstances, Roman Catholics cannot prudently impose their principles, can freedom to propagate error be provisionally
tolerated as the lesser evil. When a minority, Catholics defend external religious
freedom. But as a majority, should they
gain power, they would deny it to others.
It is true that in various forms the theory of thesis and hypothesis is defended by
certain Catholic theologians but it is also
true that it represents only one phase in a
series of differing positions taken by
churchmen from the early days when they
were first engaged with the problem of religious freedom.
Throughout, two fundamental principles
have been at work, sometimes obscured or
applied with varying emphasis to existing
social and political circumstances, yet always accepted in the mind of the Church
as such. These are: 1) the principle that
religious and civil power, or as we say
now, Church and State, have distinct rights,
each being competent in its own sphere;
and 2) the principle that conscience is inviolable, together with the corollary that,
though error has and can have no rights
(since, technically speaking, a full right responds to the objective truth of things), no
public authority exists possessing the right
to force a man to act against his conscience
even though in fact he be mistaken. At a
particular period in history one principle
may stand out with great clarity, while the
other falls into the background and becomes scarcely noticed. Later, in course
of time, the latent principle begins to come
into its own, and later still the wheel of
development will turn through its full circle and return to the position it started
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from, and there perhaps meet with fuller
understanding.
In examining this complex problem
throughout the passage of history, we must
not consider axioms or particular attitudes
in isolation. We must scrutinize, with
close attention, the Church's attitude as a
whole. We must take note of its latent
attitudes, side by side with the temporary
and ad hoc attitudes forced upon it and
upon society by the exigency of crititcal
historical situations. In doing this we may
discern, beneath these varying and sometimes inconsistent phases, the growth of a
living unity of principle and a line of true
development.
To undertake this task adequately, we
need a comprehensive and impartial view
of the complex history of the growth of religious freedom. This view must be seen
within the context of differing forms of social milieu in which the Church has lived
and propagated the life of grace. It must
include the development within the social
milieu of the principles upon which such
freedom is based.
These principles which, as has already
been said, are reducible to two, involve respect for the free and proper activity of
Church and State in their own fields and
for the inviolability of conscience, including a sincerely erroneous conscience. Of
the first it can be said that, for complete
harmony, the State should be in agreement
with the Church as to the bases of morality;
in other words the civil government should
proceed upon a true idea of the natural
law, which involves at least belief in God,
and allow for the preaching of divine revelation to interpret it correctly. Of the second it can be said that conscience cannot
and must not be forced; ad amplexandam
fidem Catholicam nemo invitus cogatur, is
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the clause in the Code of Canon Law which
states this in principle.
Religious persecution results when either
the civil power usurps religious power and
attempts to form men's consciences, or
when religious power takes over or seeks
the aid of temporal power to force men's
consciences. The Henrician and Elizabethan persecutions were instances of the
former, the Marian persecutions of the latter. Whenever Church and State diverge,
there is danger, in proportion to their divergence, of damage to men's consciences
by malformation or compulsion; this is true
not only of divergence between Church
and State, but also of divergence between
the State and religion in its widest sense,
provided such religion contains elements
of true morality.
The article concludes, in part, that the
Catholic Church goes a great deal further
than mere toleration of error as an act
of individual charity. It teaches that respect for sincere conscience is a demand of
justice, which may not rob a man of what
is his own unless his exercise of it deprives
others of their fundamental rights. These
claims of our consciences are both personal
and corporate; they belong to individuals
and to groups; no authority, civil or religious, may force a sincere conscience.
Religious freedom then is an inherent
right. It belongs to our nature as human.
Since man is made in God's image, free
will involves conscience, and conscience,
even when in error, is supreme because
it is the means of his proper fulfillment and
the guiding compass on his journey to God.
Any restrictions therefore upon the rights
of conscience, save those which safeguard
the proper liberties of others, are contrary
to God's will because contrary to the inherent nature of His rational creation.
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Ethics of Advocacy
The moral theologian, as St. Thomas
Aquinas warns us, "has to consider the
circumstances" of a human act before he
calls it "good" or "bad." The assumptions
of our traditional Anglo-American adversary system of administering justice constitute the circumstances under which the
trial lawyer works. A critique of the ethics
of advocacy must constantly refer to them.
Failure to do so results in misunderstanding and consequent cynicism about the
morals of the advocate. Hence, the loaded
questions which the puzzled layman puts to
him: "Isn't it wrong to defend a man
you know is guilty?" "Is it right to plead
a technical defense against a just claim?"
"Isn't it plainly dishonest to cross-examine a witness who has told the truth?"
In the moral sciences such abstract questions divorced from the "circumstances" of
a given case invite abstract answers. Small
wonder that the answers rarely satisfy.
Professor Edward Barrett of Notre
Dame Law School undertakes to answer
some of these questions in a manner satisfactory to lawyers and laymen in the current issue of the Notre Dame Lawyer. In
his article, "The Adversary System and
the Ethics of Advocacy," Professor Barrett
contends that our adversary system is
frankly based on the pragmatic assumption
that the truth of the controversy between
the parties to a lawsuit stands a reasonably
fairer chance of coming out when each
side fights as hard as it can to see to it
that all the evidence most favorable to it
and every rule of law supporting its theory
of the case are before the court. In this
legal combat each litigant is entitled to an
advocate professionally bound, on the one
hand, to exhibit in his client's cause "entire
devotion, warm zeal and the utmost skill,"

and on the other hand, equally obligated as
an officer of the court to discharge his trust
"within and not without the bounds of the
law," honorably resisting even in the heat
of battle the temptation to win by foul
means or by "any manner of fraud or chicane." The apparent ambivalence of this
difficult ethic thus imposed by the assumptions of the adversary system and the ultimate purpose of a lawsuit is hopefully
to be resolved by the advocate's obedience
to "his own conscience and not the conscience of his client." In our contentious
craft of advocacy the resolution is not
always easy.
Critics of the adversary system point to
the flood of manuals and textbooks on the
tactics and strategy of trial advocacy as
proof that the assumptions of the system
lead necessarily to the "fight" or "game"
theory of a lawsuit. In such books the
fledgling advocate may learn from the masters of his craft such matters as: how to
disconcert a nervous or timid witness; when
and how to hold back your surprises so
that they may be sprung at the proper tactical moment to take an opponent off
guard; how to force your adversary to
make an opening statement; how to "bottle
up" a defendant's closing argument by
cleverly distributing your points for the
plaintiff over your own opening and closing arguments, etc. In fairness be it noted
that some of these criticisms fail to relate
the suggestions on tactics and strategy
to the assumptions and conditions of the
adversary system. Others ignore the fact
that many of the books in question do not
purport to be treatises on the ethics of
advocacy which they take for granted.
There is no reason why the trial lawyer
of the highest moral principles should not
have at his skilled command the tested
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weapons of advocacy. Good morals are no
excuse for incompetence in any profession.
The advocate uses the weapons of his
craft as an advocate and not as an assassin.
Strychnine is a poison and a medicine.
Surprise as a trial tactic may be abused to
pervert justice. It may also be used to
pillory a perjurer.
Under the assumptions of our system,
the advocate does not merge his identity
with his client's or with his client's cause.
He does not surrender his personal integrity as a man nor his own dignity as a human being. He cannot falsely state to the
court a matter of fact or of law. He cannot knowingly induce or permit his client
or his client's witnesses to lie. It should not
take a canon of ethics to remind him of
the consequences of his refusal to represent
a client and courageously defend every
right afforded him under the law of the
land, no matter who the client and no matter how disfavored his case or cause may
be in the community. The very word "advocate" carries down through the centuries
the noblest connotations.
According to Professor Barrett, the truly
great advocates of our history have resolved, even in the context of the adversary
system, the apparent conflict between dedication to the idea of justice and championship of a client's cause. They have remembered that conscience is the Supreme Court
of Morals and that in the myriad of situations which no human code can reach,
the ethics of advocacy rest upon "obedience
to the enforceable."
Right to Work Laws
Catholic Lawyer readers who recall the
debate on "right to work" legislation
which appeared in the 1956 volume will
be interested in Father Coogan's latest
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statement on the subject.
Writing in a pamphlet entitled "Pope
John and the Right to Work," distributed
in June by the National Right to Work
Committee at 1025 Connecticut Avenue,
N.W., Washington, D. C., Father Coogan
argues that the concern shown by Pope
John for the rights of the worker, in the
new encyclical Mater et Magistra, is
merely a continuation of the concern already shown by the peasant Pope in his
letter of July 12, 1960, to the French
Semaine Sociale. At that time the Pope
came down squarely on the side of the
"right to work" principle, discrediting compulsory unionism. While pointing out that
membership in such "intermediate bodies"
as trade unions could be very helpful, he
insisted that "it is indispensable that they
be offered to and not imposed upon the
free choice of mankind." The worker's
acceptance of union membership, the Pope
continued, is to be "the result of a free and
justified choice of careful thought about
himself, his destiny, and the world."
Pope John's Semaine Sociale letter emphasized the great danger of the "excessive
socialization" of our time, tending towards
dehumanization. "Modem man," the Pope
declared, "sees in many cases that the
sphere in which he can think alone, act on
his own initiative, exercise his own responsibility or assert and enrich his own personality is becoming excessively restricted."
Compulsory unionization, he felt, intolerably increased the already too burdensome
"bureaucratic organization of human relations in all sections of society's life."
The Semaine Sociale letter disapproving
of forced unionism with its excessive interference with the freedom of the individual
had been long prepared for by the 1952
Christmas message of Pius XII. That mes-
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sage complained that "access to employment or to places of labor is made to depend upon registration in certain parties
or in certain organizations which trace
their origin to the labor market. Such discriminations are indicative of a wrong concept of the proper function of labor unions and their essential purpose, which is
the protection of the interests of the wage
earner within modern society, which has
become more and more anonymous and
collectivist."
Father Coogan argues further that a few
clerics identified with compulsory unionism have claimed-with no show of evidence-that the .1952 Christmas message
of Pius XI[ and the 1960 Letter of Pope
John to Semaine Sociale are pertinent only
to socialist Europe. This despite the fact
that Pope John himself, in a letter to the
Canadian Social Week Convention of September 1960, specifically applied the 1952
Christmas message to the Canadian trade
unions, international extensions of our own
American unions. Despite the fact, too,
that the Semaine Sociale letter nowhere
even hints that its application is confined
to socialist Europe. Instead, its reference
is general, to modern man, to mankind,
and it declares the evil it is combating (excessive socialization) is "one of the greatest dangers of our time." Moreover, the
227 Bishops and Archbishops of the American Catholic hierarchy in their 1960
N.C.W.C. annual statement on the "Need
for Personal Responsibility," again and
again cited the Semaine Sociale letter of
Pope John as pertinent to the American
scene.
Now Pope John in his new encyclical,
Mater et Magistra, refers to his 1960
warning in Semaine Sociale, making verbatim citations from it on the dangers of

excessive socialization. Moreover, he opens
the door to the "right to work" principle
by adding that "where the services of the
state are lacking or defective, there is incurable disorder and exploitation of the
weak on the part of the unscrupulous strong
who flourish in every land and at all
times." In the light of the findings concerning union abuse of the individual
worker by Senator McClellan's committee,
surely, if anywhere, there is need for state
action-at least by striking down compulsory membership in such unions and leaving workers free to save themselves from
union violence and injustice.
Father Coogan concludes:
Moreover, the new encyclical re-emphasizes
the repeated papal warnings of the necessity of the principle of subsidiarity, that
"fundamental principle of social philosophy,
unshaken and unchangeable." That principle declares it "wrong to withdraw from the
individual and commit to the community
at large what private enterprise and industry can accomplish." Consequently, there
must be no interference with the "right that
individual persons possess of being always
primarily responsible for their own upkeep and that of their families." Pope John
adds that "Experience shows that where
the personal initiative of individuals is lacking, there is political tyranny." The individual is perfected through self-activity. Is
not compulsory unionism, then, an unjustified limitation upon personal initiative?
And yet certain clerics-obdurate in
their commitment to compulsory unionism
-claim to find in the new encyclical justification for forced membership in American labor unions. Their argument is that the
encyclical commends "the work performed
with true Christian spirit" by certain Catholics in "associations of workers" operating on natural law principles. But we ask, is
a commendation of the work of those individuals a commendation of the associations
themselves? Moreover, what percentage of
the millions of Catholics functioning in
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American labor unions have performed
"with a true Christian spirit?" Will Herberg,
the friendly and informed Jewish commentator, has paid special tribute to the
Catholic unionists, yet declares that "There
has been an almost total divorce between
their religion and their labor activity." And
as to whether our unions take their inspirations from the natural law, Herberg adds
that "The lack of a labor conscience ...

is,

in a sense, the basic problem of American
trade unionism."
Hence we can say with no fear of successful contradition, that absolutely nothing in
the new encyclical justifies compulsory unionism. We can broaden that by saying
the Vatican has never at any time authorized compulsory membership in any labor
union whatever, not even in the Christian
unions which alone have had her positive
approval. The Right to Work principle,
that "Americans must have the right but not
be compelled to join labor unions," is a
thoroughly Catholic principle.
Aid to Education
Dean John Hayes of Loyola University

Law School, whose article on obscenity
was featured in the Spring issue of The
Catholic Lawyer, is also the feature author
in the Spring issue of the De Paul Law

Review. Writing on "Federal

Aid to

Church-Related Schools," Dean Hayes' position is that there are a number of constitutionally-permissible forms of participation by church-related schools in any
program of massive federal aid to educa-

tion. The question remains as to whether
any of them ought to be utilized.
The same federal government which
has vindicated the basic constitutional
rights of parents and children to choose to
be educated in private and church-related
schools ought not thereafter to initiate a
program which, by excluding such schools
without constitutional necessity, substantially imperils their healthy existence and
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development. On the contrary, to be consistent with the policy of constitutional
law, comparable aid ought to be afforded
to those schools by including them in the
federal program in forms which are permissible under the Constitution as presently
construed.
Why would the initiation of a program
of massive federal aid to public schools
only imperil the healthy existence and development of the church-related schools
thereby excluded without constitutional necessity? Because, so long as parents and
children choose to exercise their constitutional right to attend church-related
schools, those schools, in justice both to
their patrons and to the governments whose
public purposes they subserve, must keep
pace with the educational facilities, practices and standards of the public schools.
They must do so not only to comply with
the minimal requirements of governmental
supervisory agencies and private accrediting agencies, but also to continue to provide a competitively-excellent secular education together with the religious and moral
education which is the distinctive plus
value which the public schools are legally
unable to provide. If and when, therefore,
new massive federal aid is extended
to public schools, church-related schools
will have to keep up with whatever improvements and developments the federal
money will enable the public schools to
undertake and public and private accrediting agencies thereafter to exact-and this
in addition to meeting the sharp growth
demands to which they, like the public
schools, are currently being subjected. The
money to sustain these new burdens of
meeting growth requirements and improved public school standards must come
either as tuition payments or as contribu-
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titons from the patrons of the church-related schools, who are also simultaneously
sustaining as taxpayers their fair share of
the costs of the growth requirements of the
public schools plus the costs of the new
massive federal aid to the public schools.
As an example, if the State of Mississippi
used half of its share of the proposed federal aid to public elementary and secondary schools to increase teachers' salaries,
the estimate is that the annual salary of
each such teacher would be raised $480.00.
In addition to paying their share of the
cost of this federal aid, the patrons of the
church-related schools in Mississippi would
have to match that salary raise for the increasing number of lay teachers in those
schools or be content with second-rate lay
teaching personnel and suffer the inevitable
consequences.
This is the prospect which has caused
His Eminence, Cardinal Spellman, to say
that any new program of massive federal
aid which excludes church-related schools
is the beginning of the end for those
schools. And Dean Hayes' point is that the
destruction or substantial impairment of
church-related schools without constitutional necessity is inconsistent with the
policy of constitutional protection of the
rights of children to an education in
church-related schools and the rights of
their parents to direct and control the education of their children by choosing to
send them to church-related schools.
The American Tradition
The February 1962 issue of the Fordham Law Review is entitled "The Dedication Issue" and contains the papers given
by distinguished guests present at the dedication of the new law school buildings
at Fordham.

Among the papers is one by the Most
Reverend John J. Wright entitled "The
American Tradition and Its Religious Inspiration." Bishop Wright's words are especially interesting in view of the fact that
they were written and delivered before the
United States Supreme Court handed down
the Engel v. Vitale decision.
According to Bishop Wright the conservatism of our forefathers is particularly
saving in time of crisis; it reminds us that
there will be, when the tumult and the
shouting die, no new Heaven and no new
Earth. It reminds us that the citizens of
the brave new world to be will still be men,
not gods. It reminds us that any future
world can only be built out of whatever
good survives from the old. It warns us
never to hold lightly the good which our
forefathers built so patiently here in this
land; never to gamble with the liberties
which are the heart and soul of that good;
never to permit the religious faith, which
taught us those liberties, to grow cold;
never to forget the blessings on our traditions by which Almight God has confirmed
the wisdom of these who, building it, honored Him and His chief creature, the spiritual person.
Yet even in America are sometimes
heard the voices of new prophets who
spread a teaching forgetful of our forefathers' God and of their reverence for the
dignity of the human person. These new
teachers write their laws without reference
to God, and indifferent to Sacred Scripture
with its warning that we put not our trust
in princes; they propose, sooner or later,
a government of men, not laws. They talk
little of the family, less of the sovereignty
of parents and not at all of the spiritual
roots of personality. They speak rather of
race, of tribe, of class-consciousness, of
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nationalism or of internationalism, not of
the person. They hold in contempt or neglect, by studied silence, the earthly beginnings of the Kingdom of God, and they
boast of their readiness to build, without
the help of Heaven, a self-sufficient City
of Man. They repudiate the religious revelation which is the heart of our tradition
of faith and they reject the legal concept
of objective natural law which was the
heart of our tradition of freedom. The
phrases which meant so much to our
Founding Fathers that they enshrined them
in the basic documents of our national life
-phrases which spoke of natural law and
of God's authority-"the laws of nature
and of nature's God"-have no meaning
whatsoever for many who now seek to
write or construe the laws of our land
in shaping its educational policy.
People tell us blandly, "Our courts are
no longer 'natural law' courts." Or concerning legislation governing education,
marriage, or other partially moral matters,
they assert, "Our democracy is strictly secular. Its citizens may individually reverence their God, gods, or moral laws, but
the State is not concerned with sacred matters nor with moral values!"
All this may be, but it was not always so.
Some of the men who occupy our courts
may not accept the natural law, but the
men who founded these courts did accept
such "highxr law" and gave our courts
a religious aura for their protection. Our
democracy may have become more amoral
or unreligious in the days of secularism,
but in the days of its original inspiration
and initial strength those who launched it
talked of the endowments man has from
his Creator and of his consequent accountability to God; that is how our Republic
came to be founded.

1962

No defense of Christianity and of the
values which it taught our forefathers could
be more effective than the present straits
to which these new prophets, contemptuous
of the faith, have reduced our society.
Nothing could better warrant meditation
of the lesson our forefathers learned so
well, a lesson that the Catholics of Poland
taught Catherine II of Russia: "We love
liberty and therefore we love religion even
more; we are free because we love religion."
Censorship
The current issue of the University of
Toronto Law Journal contains an excellent
article dealing with "Obscenity, Censorship, and Juveline Delinquency," by Professor Bernard Green. In discussing the issue of whether obscene publications are a
significant factor in the spread of juvenile
delinquency and should therefore be suppressed, Professor Green concludes that,
on balance, the intervention of the state
seems necessary. Despite the paucity of
evidence, there is a widespread popular belief that obscene and pornographic matter
plays an important role in causing juvenile
delinquency. Furthermore, parents who
share the popular belief lack the ability
to control the. content of communications
that their children are exposed to.
In their praiseworthy desire to protect
the freedom of the adult to read and see
adult material, the courts have invalidated
legislation designed to protect children at
all costs. Several groups feel that, as a result, there is inadequate protection of the
young. To remedy this, many public officials knowingly engage in extra-legal censorship, using methods that are often despicable. They are encouraged and assisted
by private groups who also proclaim that
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their intention is to protect the young.
There is no question that society is injured
by the lawless action of state officials and
the exercise of police powers by private
groups; whereas the danger that is avoided
-the possible harm of juveniles-is indefinite and probably not very significant. Nor
can self-regulation by the public mass media be looked to as a complete and effective
alternative to state action. The mass media would require the assistance of the
state to enforce the most logical method of
control, age classification. Furthermore,
the results of self-regulation in those media which have developed codes are unsatisfactory: the products tend to be bland;
in any case the complaints of improper material in the mass media continue unabated.
Assuming the desirability of governmental control, we must decide what level
of government-federal, state or municipal-should exercise the power. This
question raises important issues of fedeiali~m. At the present time we have all levels
of government acting in the field, with unfortunate and sometimes ludicrous results.
Books that in one jurisdiction circulate
freely are proscribed in another. In a time
when, we are told, large numbers of Americans move from one end of the country
to the other, it may be asked why material
that would not be harmful to them in one
place would suddenly be dangerous in another. Small governmental units lack the
resources to perform control functions
adequately. Furthermore, the fact is that
certain key cities can affect the content of
communications in other jurisdictions. Citizens of these latter jurisdictions do not
effectively participate in the decision of
what they will be allowed to see or read.
For these reasons, municipalities should be
divested of all censorship functions.

The choice that is left, according to Professor Green, is between state and federal
control. Mr. Justice Harlan, in urging that
the censorship function should be reserved
for the states, claims that federal control
would create a greater danger to civil liberties. Perhaps he is right. But if three states
such as New York, California, and Pennsylvania were to declare a book obscene
despite the contrary conclusions of other
states, would any publisher find it profitable to sell the book? Would not those
states in fact dictate to the rest of the nation what would be read? And this would
be done, moreover, without any power on
the part of citizens in other states to affect
the action. Mass communications are not
local problems; national action is necessary if an adequate system of control is
to be developed. And national action would
enhance one of the great advantages of a
method of prior restraint-a single decision
frees the way for publication of the examined material without danger to the publisher anywhere in the country.
Professor Green recommends that our
aim must be to devise a procedure that will
not restrict the flow of adult material to
adult readers and viewers, and yet will
protect juveniles. A system of age classification would seem to offer the best hope.
Age classification procedures have been
used in several jurisdictions in the United
States and elsewhere, but only for motion
pictures. Even that use has been criticized
as impractical and as containing some of
the dangers inherent in any scheme of prior
restraint. Age classification schemes could
be used in media other than motion pictures. Books and magazines could be imprinted with a special sign indicating that
they were not to be sold or given to anyone under a specific age. But there is no
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way of absolutely controlling who will see
or hear what program on radio or television. Once we recognize that total control
is an impossibility the only solution-and
the one that has been adopted, but not
wholeheartedly-is to schedule adult programs in the later hours of the evening
when juveniles are supposedly asleep.
Nor need an age classification procedure
impose any undue burden on the bookseller
or theatre owner. He would only be liable
if he knowingly or recklessly sold or offered
prohibited material to a juvenile under the
prescribed age. The argument that an age
classification scheme would entail great
cost seems difficult to counter. One way
of lowering costs would be to allow a communicator the option of submitting or not
submitting his material for review. Communication clearly intended for adults only
probably would not be submitted. Many
firms in the communication industry now
contribute to the costs of policing self-regulating in their field. An age classification
scheme should lessen the need for and the
expense of extensive self-regulation. There
would be no undue burden on the mass
media if they were required to meet some
of the costs of the new system.
Catholic Law Schools
In the current issue of the Santa Clara
Lawyer, Dean Leo Huard of Santa Clara
Law School comments on the article entitled "Christian Precepts in the Common
Law" by John Hervey which appeared in
the Autumn 1961 issue of The Catholic
Lawyer.
Writing on the subject of "Education for
Professional Responsibility and the Catholic Law School," Dean Huard points out
that according to Dr. Hervey's article every
teacher in every law school can infuse

Christian precepts into every law school
course.
Dean Huard then comments that Dr.
Hervey is not a Catholic, but if "Natural
Law" and "good morals" were introduced
at appropriate points in his thesis, there
would be little to quarrel with therein. If
all law school courses were analyzed in
terms of Natural Law and good morals, the
analyzes would provide an excellent basis
for a strong program of education for professional responsibility.
According to Dean Huard, by the very
nature of things, Catholic legal education
is in the hands of laymen. Some of these
people are Catholic, others are not. Catholic or non-Catholic, lay persons tend to
feel disqualified the moment reference is
made to Natural Law and to morals. They
tend to feel that these are matters for the
clergy rather than the lawyer and they are,
of course, partly right. But, if these gifted
people are lost because of this feeling,
Catholic legal education will suffer a mortal blow. We, all of us, laymen and clergy,
teachers and practitioners, must join in
convincing our lay teachers that they need
not become theologians and moralists in
order to teach in Catholic law schools.
They must be made to realize this.
We should ask only that they approach
the legal problems presented in their
courses from the Natural Law standpoint.
Beyond this, they need only display a willingness to call upon the members of the
Theology and Philosophy departments.
The talents of the able people in these
departments are not utilized nearly enough
and it would be good pedagogy, as well as
good sense, to bring this inter-disciplinary
approach to bear upon education for professional responsibility.
Catholic law
schools are in a particularly fine position
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to relate professional responsibility to the
law of God as well as to the law of man.
This is their unique contribution and they
should make haste to fulfill it.
The Eichmann Trial
A further footnote on the Eichmann trial
has appeared recently in the form of a
pamphlet published by the Fund for the
Republic entitled "The Eichmann Trial
and the Rule of Law." Written by Yosal
Rogat, whose special field is constitutional
law, the treatise criticizes Israel for failing
to subordinate national desires in the decision by refusing to relinquish jurisdiction
of the trial to an international court.
According to Mr. Rogat:
[T]he Eichmann trial forces us to consider
the most basic moral and political perplexities, for, whatever else the Nazis horror
may have taught us, it made clear that the
patterns of decency and humanity that we
have wanted to see as a deep part of the
world are, to a major extent, only surface
decoration. In our own time men have assumed that everything is possible and have
performed in daylight acts that they should
not have acknowledged even as fantasies.
We know now that we dare not take civilization for granted; that we must explicitly
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for St. Thomas it is. The reason for this
difference lies in their definitions of the
natural law. Bracton identifies it with the
spontaneous movements of animal appetites in both beasts and men; Thomas uses
the term to denote the natural light of practical reason, through which man shares in
the divine idea of the government of the
world. This light is identified with certain
general and indemonstrable principles of

guard against the eruption of barbarism and
moral chaos.
Can we, however, in holding others totally
guilty, avoid the arrogance and pride of
the false belief that we are ourselves totally guiltless? In a deep sense one becomes competent to judge not by proving
that he differs completely from the defendant, but by his awareness of what it is
that he shares with him. Are we, then, certain that our own motivation for wanting
to punish the Nazis has in it as little as
possible of the very gratification in applying punishment that they themselves felt?
Such issues can present themselves even
when action takes place within legal forms,
recognizing this makes it all the more imperative to foster strong and clearly disinterested institutions in order to counteract human partiality and weakness. In the
Oresteia,Aeschylus elaborated the theme of
a compelling chain reaction of vengeance
and of primitive retaliation, of blood demanding more blood and of force that destroys both those who use it and those
who feel it. It is a reaction that stops only
with the establishment of a dispassionate
tribunal. The Western world has never
ceased to be preoccupied with the central
problem of the Oresteia. In has characteristically reacted to a deep moral disorder
by attempting to impose a legal order upon
it. Today, we have no alternative.

moral conduct which God has imprinted
in the intellectual nature of man.
For both Bracton and St. Thomas, God
is the ultimate recourse against abuse of
political authority. But while Bracton
makes God the only, as well as ultimate,
recourse, Thomas speaks explicitly of the
right of deposition of a tyrant. Finally,
Bracton, the judge, sees the Last Judgment
and the divine vengeance as God's remedy
for tyranny; Thomas, the theologian, sees
also God's power to change the tyrant's
heart.

